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How
THE ANTARCTIC
SCIENCE,
TOURISM,
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1996 FAILS ANTARCTICA

AND

KATHLEEN T. MULVILLE*
I. INTRODUCTION

Few places still exist that mankind has not explored fully. The
three most vast areas that are still primarily unexplored are the "global
commons," which include the high seas, outer space, and the continent of
Antarctica.' The global commons are the last to be explored for the very
reason that they are so interesting: they have been considered inaccessible
until very recently and are basically untouched by mankind.2 As the thirst
grows for a basic scientific understanding of these areas and their
mysteries, the amount of research activity does as well.? Even the research
that occurs in the global commons is unique. Because the areas are so
inaccessible, the cost of researching them is phenomenal.4 In order to
minimize the cost and to spread the opportunities for research among the
many interested countries, much of the research must be done through
joint international effort.'
The international community is also aware that the recent flood of
scientific activities in the global commons, whether joint or not, bring with
them new environmental concerns for preserving these areas. 6 Each of the
global commons has been the subject of a number of international treaties
" Ms. Mulville received her B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University
of Virginia in
1994 and her J.D. from the College of William and Mary School of Law in 1999.
' See Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last Frontiersfor Mineral Resources: A
Comparison of the InternationalLaw Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and
Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (1990). See also LCDR Winthrop, NEPA in

the "Global Commons," ARMY LAW., July 1993, at 44, 44 (1993).
2 See CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER & ETHEL R. THEIS, EAGLE OVER THE ICE 10- 17 (1997).
" See Francesco Francioni, Introduction: A Decade of Development in Antarctic
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 1, 1-3 (Francesco
Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2d ed. 1996).
4 See JOYNER

& THEIS, supranote 2, at 18.

' Norman R. Augustine, The United States in Antarctica in the 21 st Century, Testimony
to the Committee on Science of the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 12, 1997),
available in 1997 WL 8219969.
6 See Jacques-Yves Cousteau & Bertrand Charrier, Introduction: The Antarctic: A
Challenge to Global Environment Policy, in THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 6 (Joe Verhoeven et al. eds., 1992).
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that either specifically address environmental issues or that do so
indirectly.7
The Antarctic is governed by a series of international agreements
referred to collectively as the Antarctic Treaty System The most recent
treaty concerning Antarctica, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty,9 focuses almost entirely on environmental issues. In
order for the Protocol to be ratified, the signing parties must enact their
own domestic laws that conform to the Protocol." The United States
lingered for a number of years over the terms of a U.S. domestic law to
conform to the Protocol." The major bone of contention among the
various interested parties was whether to apply an existing domestic
environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 2 as
the method for implementing the Protocol. 3
Congress enacted the final draft of a new domestic law to comply
with the Protocol in 1996."4 The new law is the Antarctic Science,
Tourism, and Conservation Act of 1996 (Act or ASTCA). 5 The Act
expressly incorporates NEPA.16 This Act makes great strides in
reconciling the language of NEPA with the required language of the
7
Protocol especially in the arena of Environmental Impact Assessments.
The Environmental Impact Assessment is an important method for
determining the negative effects that an activity will have on a given
7 See The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402

U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter The Antarctic Treaty]. See also United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1261. See, e.g., Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5 1979, art. 11, para. 1, 34 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 20, UN Doc. No. A/34/20, reprinted in 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, and in 18
I.L.M. 1434 (entered into force July 11, 1984).
8 See Joe Verhoeven, General Introduction, in THE ANTARCTIC
ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW supra note 6, at 11, 14.
' The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force Jan. 15, 1998) [hereinafter The Protocol].
'0See id. art. 13, 30 I.L.M. at 1466.
" See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 184-86.
'2National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
'3

See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 186.

The Antarctic Science, Tourism, and Conservation Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 24012413 (1985 & Supp. 1998).
" See id.
"

16See id. § 2403.

17See id. See also The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, 30 I.L.M. at 1473-75.
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environment, thus allowing the actors to weigh the benefits of their actions
versus the possible consequences of the acts.' 8
One major section of the Act specifically addresses Environmental
Impact Assessments in the context of joint international- projects. 9 It
provides that if a Party to the Protocol is the major contributor to a project,
has signed, ratified, or acceded to the Treaty, and is responsible for the
coordination of environmental impact assessment procedures then the U.S.
agencies involved are not responsible for preparing an environmental
impact assessment.2" The Protocol, on the other hand, simply requires that
the involved Parties agree as to who will do the Environmental Impact
Assessments.2' On this topic, the Protocol mentions "Parties," meaning
the initial group of countries that signed the agreement, in addition to
those that later ratified or acceded to the Protocol.22 However, the
Protocol does not differentiate between the steps Parties should take when
engaged in a joint project with a country that has signed the Protocol as
opposed to one that has merely acceded.23
The section of the Act on joint projects has the potential for
creating conflict and inefficiency in practice by not providing for the most
qualified country to perform the EIA.24 First, more and more countries are
joining the Antarctic Treaty System and, thus, the Protocol.
These
countries may have a substantial amount of political influence, but may
not be prepared or have a desire to perform an adequate environmental

,8 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403; The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, 30 I.L.M. at 1473-75.
19See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).

20 See id.
2 See The

Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, para. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 1464 ("Where activities are

planned jointly by more than one Party, the Parties involved shall nominate one of their
number to coordinate the implementation of the environmental impact assessment
procedures set out in Annex I.").
22 See, e.g., The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464; Telephone Interview
with Harlan Cohen, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Ocean Affairs, Department of
State (Feb. 20, 23, 1998).
2 See The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464.
24 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
25 See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 174, 179. Fourteen countries sought admission
to the consultative party group of the Antarctic Treaty between 1980 and 1991. See id.
By 1996, there were 26 consultative parties and 17 acceding states. See id. at 175. With
regard to the Protocol, all 26 consultative parties and 8 non-consultative parties to the
Antarctic Treaty had signed it by 1995. See id. at 179.
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26
assessment. Yet, the Act would allow these countries not only to do the
environmental assessment, but also to relieve the United States from that
duty.2 7 Secondly, it is possible that Parties and ratifying or acceding
countries that are not major contributors would be more qualified to do
adequate environmental assessments than some that are major
contributors, but the Act does not recognize this possibility.28 Allowing
countries that are most qualified to do the impact assessments could be
accomplished without placing the burden on the United States.29
Contribution to joint projects should only have been a major
concern under the Act in situations where the United States is the major
contributor. In such cases, the United States should attempt to be
responsible for the environmental impact assessments. 30 However, where
26 See

JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 175.
The question remains whether these states can continue to work within
the structure and framework of the treaty system ....
. . . Such [political] motives add an extra dimension to Antarctic
decision making: Obtaining consensus becomes more difficult when
certain members in an organization have little expert knowledge of the
subject and become preoccupied with political or ideological issues.

Id.
27 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b). The Act merely states that when:
the major part of the joint activity is being contributed by a
(A)
government or governments other than the United States;
(B)
one such government is coordinating the implementation of
environmental impact assessment procedures for that activity; and
such government has signed, ratified, or acceded to the
(C)
Protocol,
the requirements of subsection (a) [requiring a United States agency to
prepare an Environmental impact assessment] shall not apply with
respect to that activity.
Id.
2' See id. That is, a country with the capability to do an Impact Assessment might
receive a negative reaction from the United States even if selected by the other parties,
simply because it is not one of the major contributors. The United States would then
redundantly do its own EIS.
' The United States is in no way restricted from doing its own analysis as to the
qualification of other countries in charge of Environmental Impact Assessment when it
appears that a country's capabilities are questionable.
" When the United States is the main contributor to a project, it may want control over
the environmental assessment, so as to insure that its funds are not being used to pollute
the environment. However, not every country may feel that pressure. The newer parties,
especially, may find the support of more experienced parties to be helpful.
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the United States is not the main contributor, it would have been better off
in its attempt to protect the Antarctic environment had the new Act merely
rephrased the Protocol and allowed the involved Parties to choose among
themselves.'
In applying a law to ratifying or acceding countries, the
United States should have applied a similar analysis devoid of any
reference to contribution.32
This Note explores section 2403 of the Antarctic Science, Tourism,
and Conservation Act of 1996, which directly relates to joint projects.33 In
addition, this Note attempts to shed light on where the section fails, what
alternatives might have been better, and what can still be done to make the
section effective. Part II of the Note discusses the historical background
of Antarctica and the international treaties that comprise the Antarctic
Treaty System. Part III analyzes what international law applies in
Antarctica and how the Antarctic Treaty System relates to actual
international law on the continent. Part IV discusses the United States
domestic laws and their scope in the international arena. This part of the
note also analyzes how domestic law interacts with the Protocol 3 4 to
actually create international law in Antarctica. Part V evaluates section
2403a(b) of the Act and describes how the Section fits with the new
international law of the Protocol. The analysis includes an inquiry into the
weaknesses of the section and an attempt to address those weaknesses with
suggestions for application by the National Science Foundation. Part VI is
a conclusion and a summary of the drawbacks of the Act explored in Part
V.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
Antarctica is the coldest, driest environment on earth.3 5

Almost

3"A mere change in the drafting of the law would have given the United States more
flexibility in dealing with other countries and making the decision as to which country
would be responsible for the EIS, especially considering that the Protocol was drafted to
allow selection amongst the parties, without mention of contribution as a factor. See The
Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464.
-'2 Again, the Act should have given the United States the flexibility to work with other
countries to develop practical answers without placing monetary limitations on its ability
to do so. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
" See id.

14 See generally The Protocol, supra note 9.
3. See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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the entire continent is covered by ice that is on average 6,600 feet thick.36
The ice contains about ninety percent of the earth's freshwater supply.37
The frigid and pristine environment allows scientists to conduct important
experiments that affect the rest of the world, including research into global
warming, the ozone layer, the rise of the sea level, and the recovery of
meteorites.38
The United States was the first country to make a landing in
Antarctica in 1821 and was active in exploring the continent for over one
hundred years afterward. 39 Later, Antarctica was claimed by seven
countries: the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway,
Chile, and Argentina.' Two other countries, the United States and the
Soviet Union (Russia today), also retained the right to enforce a claim
later.4' By the start of the 1950's, the tension between claimants
concerning their conflicting territorial claims had become heated.42
Scientists were concerned about politics affecting their work on the
continent and took measures to enable research to continue without
political ramifications, including the creation of International Geophysical
Years.43 Their system worked well, providing enough security to the
countries so that they could build work stations and continue research
It also "set the stage" for a more reaching cooperation
unhampered.'
among the countries.45
The countries followed the lead of the scientists and enacted the
Antarctic Treaty in 1959.46 The Treaty was initially signed by twelve
countries, including the seven claimant states and five non-claimant
states.47 The five non-claimant states were allowed to become involved in
36See id. at 11.

3 See id.

See Augustine, supra note 5.
See JOYNER & THEIS, sutpra note 2, at 21-26.
4See id. at 36. All of these claims were made
'9

between 1908 and 1943. See id.

See id.
42 See id. at 30.
"

43 See id. The International Geophysical Year was "a multinational effort designed to
foster scientific cooperation in a number of fields, with Antarctic Research figured
among them." See id.
prominently
44
See id. at 31.
45 See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 31.
6
See id. at 30-33. See generally'The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7.
41 See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, 12 U.S.T. at 794, 402 U.N.T.S. at 72. See also

Alfred van der Essen, The Origin of the Antarctic System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
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the Treaty process because they had engaged in scientific research in
Antarctica already or were planning to do so." As time has progressed,
numerous other countries have demonstrated interest in Antarctic research
and have acceded to the Treaty. As of 1995, forty-two states were parties
49

to the Treaty.

The Treaty is composed of fourteen articles that each address
various issues of concern."
In the first two Articles of the Antarctic
Treaty, the continent is dedicated to peaceful purposes and the freedom to
conduct scientific research."' Article IV was very contentious among the
twelve States when the Treaty was written because it effectively "froze"
the claims of the countries who had made them. 2 On the issue of
jurisdiction over the actions of observers or scientific personnel, the states
were wary. 3 They did not want to potentially subject their nationals to
foreign courts 4 Thus, Article VIII allows that actors for a state are
subject only to the jurisdiction of their own courts.5
The remaining
Articles address other environmental topics and create procedures to
implement the Treaty.56
supra note 3, at 17, 19. The five non-claimant states were the United
States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Belgium, and South Africa. See id.
48 See van der Essen, supra note 47, at 19.
49
See id. at 25.
oSee generally The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7.
5'See id. arts. I, II, 12 U.S.T. at 795, 402 U.N.T.S. at 72-75.
52 "The understanding that all [International Geographical Year] activities would be
ANTARCTICA,

nonpolitical and that none would serve as the basis for territorial claims clearly
influenced the decision of claimant parties to 'freeze' their claims to Antarctic territory."
van der Essen, supra note 47, at 21. See also JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 36 (The
Antarctic Treaty "preserves the position of claimants and nonclaimant states, serving the
interests of both by banning new claims or expansion of existing ones.").
" See Jonathan Blum, Comment, The Deep Freeze: Torts. Choice of Law, and tile
Antarctic Treaty Regime, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 667, 674 (1994).
54 States were concerned that conceding jurisdiction could weaken territorial claims. See
id. at 675.
" See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. VIII, para. 1, 12 U.S.T. at 797-98, 402
U.N.T.S. at 78-79; Blum. supra note 53, at 675. Article VIII is not without its
drawbacks. In cases of jurisdictional disputes between States, the States are left to
resolve the disputes on their own. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, 12 U.S.T. at
797-98, 402 U.N.T.S. at 78. There is no mechanism to ensure the States will comply
with the Article. See generally The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7.
56 See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, 12 U.S.T. at 798-800, 402 U.N.T.S. at 78-85;
van der Essen, supra note 47, at 23. The remaining Articles forbid nuclear testing in
Antarctica, require that countries allow inspection of their activities, outline methods for
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One of the most important Articles to the Antarctic Treaty was
Article IX.17 Article IX requires that the original Parties meet periodically
to discuss important issues concerning Antarctica as they may arise. 8 The
meetings are called Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). 9
Activities at these meetings range from the "exchange of views to the
negotiation of binding legal instruments."60 It is at these meetings that
environmental issues are discussed in depth.6' A number of international
treaties have resulted from the discussions at the ATCMs.62
The third meeting of the Parties resulted in the Agreed Measures
for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna (Agreed Measures).63
However, the entry into force of the Agreed Measures was delayed until
1980 due to dissent over jurisdictional issues.' The Agreed Measures list
certain species of animals to be protected and require a permit to kill or
capture any native species.65 They also restrict importation of foreign
plants and animals.66 The agreement also allowed areas of Antarctica to be
designated as specially protected under the Agreed Measures.67 The
number of these areas set aside for protection continues to grow.6"
peaceful settlement of disputes, and also contain a clause that allows accession by other
States. See van der Essen, supra note 47, at 23-25.
" See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX, 12 U.S.T. at 798, 402 U.N.T.S. at 7880; van der Essen, supra note 47, at 23.
58
See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 1, 12 U.S.T. at 798, 402 U.N.T.S.
at 78-80. Article IX states that the Parties shall meet in part: "for the purpose of
exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to
Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments,
measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of this Treaty

. .

. " Id. art. IX,

para. 1. It goes on to state that one of the measures that should be considered at the
meetings is the "preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica." Id. art.
IX, para. l(f).
" See van der Essen, supra note 47, at 23.
JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 41.
6! See id. at 42-43.
60

62

63

See id. at 44.
See Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13,

1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692
(1973) [hereinafter Agreed Measures]; van der Essen, supra note 47, at 26.
6' See van der Essen, supra note 47, at 26.
65 See Agreed Measures, supra note 63, 17 U.S.T. at 997-99.
66
See id. at 1000.
67 See id. at 997.
61 See, e.g., JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 103-104 (by 1996, at least 23 sites were
designated specially protected areas, and 36 Sites of Special Scientific Interest were
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At the seventh meeting, the Parties adopted the Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (Convention). 69 The Convention applies
even to areas outside of the area normally designated as included under the
Antarctic Treaty and applies to the high seas.7° Rather than forbidding all
capturing of seals, the Convention merely states a limit on the number that
may be caught annually. 7' The enforcement of the Convention is relegated
to the Scientific Community on Antarctic Research (SCAR).7 - Any party
may call meetings in the event SCAR determines that there is a real danger
to a species.73 Otherwise, the parties meet every five years.74 So far the
Convention has been extremely successful in preserving and protecting
Antarctic seals. 75
The Parties reached a third agreement in the form of the
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR or Convention).76 The Convention is based on the "ecosystem
approach."77 Under the Convention, the harvesting of certain species must
be related to the "consequences for other dependent species in the
ecosystem."78 The Parties also created a permanent Commission to
monitor and regulate conservation measures in Antarctica. 79 The success
of this Convention has been questioned, but it appears to be working well
and is accepted by countries not party to the Convention."
designated).
69 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, adopted June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T.
441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978)
[hereinafter Seals Convention]. See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 104.
70 See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 103-04.
" See Seals Convention, supra note 69, 29 U.S.T. at 444-45.
'2 See id. at 445-46.
7 See id. at 445.
7 See id. at 446.
" See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 105 ("The CCAS has been successful in
preventing a recurrence of the extermination of some species of Antarctic seals .... Due

largely to the foresight of the [Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties], scientific research
now indicates that Antarctic seals have not been adversely affected by human activities in
the Southern Ocean.").
76 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done May 20,
1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47 (entered into force Apr. 7,
1982) [hereinafter CCAMLR].
7See

JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 106-07.

78 See id. at 106.

7 See CCAMLR, supra note 76, 33 U.S.T. at 3482-85, 1329 U.N.T.S. at 51-54.
80 "F.M. Auburn, for example, finds that, in theory, the ecosystem may be safeguarded
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The focus of the international community shifted more heavily to
the environment in the 1980s when discussions concerning the mining of
mineral resources in Antarctica began.81 Other issues, such as tourism,
also began to stress the existing regime." The Consulting Parties drafted
and adopted another Convention in Wellington in 1988 to limit mineral
3
exploration and exploitation in Antarctica.1
However, the trend toward even stricter environmental protection
of Antarctica continued. One major impetus for the trend was a number of
environmental accidents.
In early 1989, three different oil spills were
reported off of the coast of Antarctica.85 However, these spills were minor
when compared to the oil spilled from the Exxon Valdez off the coast of
Alaska in March of 1989 in which approximately 11 million gallons of
crude oil spilled out and killed wildlife along forty-five miles of Alaskan
coastline.8 6 These accidents created an increased awareness of the need for
environmental protection of the Antarctic area. 7
A year after the Wellington Convention, both Australia and France
refused to sign the accord.88 Many countries were interested in pursuing
but practical application will probably not bear out the promise of conservation."
JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 108. See also Olav Schram Stokke, The Effectiveness
of CCAMLR, in GOVERNING THE ANTARCTIC 151 (Olav Schram Stokke & Davor Vidas
eds., 1996).
8'See Francesco Francioni, The Origin of the Antarctic System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
FOR ANTARCTICA, supra note 3, at 1, 2.
82 See Richard A. Herr, The Regulation of Antarctic Tourism: A Study in Regime
Effectiveness in GOVERNING THE ANTARCTIC, supra note 80, at 203, 207. Tourism has
been estimated at 60,000 tourists over the last 40 years and the numbers are growing.
See UN: First Committee approves draft text on Antarctica: Part I, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov.
26, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 14649740. See also Augustine, supra note 5.
83 See Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities, done
June 2, 1988, Doc. AMR/SCM/88/78, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 859 [hereinafter Minerals
Convention].
84 See Christopher C. Joyner, The Effectiveness of CRAMRA. in GOVERNING THE
ANTARCTIC, supra note 80, at 152.
85 See id. An Argentinean supply ship, a British supply ship, and a Peruvian research
vessel all were reported as having spilled oil. See id. The Argentinean ship spilled
250,000 barrels of diesel fuel into the ocean, while the Peruvian ship leaked only a small
amount of oil. See id. The British Antarctic Survey denied that any oil spilled from their
ship. See id.

86 See id.
87 See id.

See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 108. The Australian government gave as its
reason that it would instead pursue a more comprehensive environmental agreement. See
58
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research for energy sources, like oil, for their own national use.89 The
international community began to strongly oppose the Convention,
primarily because it appeared to be ineffective and jeopardized the purity
of the Antarctic continent. 9' The solution to these concerns with
environmental issues in the Antarctic came in the form of the Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.9 ' As a result of the
creation of the Protocol, the Wellington Convention was never enacted. 92
The Madrid Protocol, as it came to be known, "extends and
improves the effectiveness of the treaty system to preserve the region's
environment." 93 In making the Protocol, the Parties clearly stated that the
agreement does not in any way affect or undermine the existing Treaties
present in the Antarctic regime. 94 Instead, the Protocol reaffirms the
designation of Antarctica as a special place that should be reserved for
peaceful and scientific activities."
It also "establishes a relatively
comprehensive, legally binding regime for ensuring that all activities
undertaken in Antarctica are consistent with protection of that
environment and the continent's dependent and associated ecosystems. 9 6
The Protocol also placed a moratorium on the mining of minerals in
Antarctica, unless related to science. 97 In addition, the Protocol calls for
the formation of a Committee on Environmental Protection (CEP) to
provide advice to the Parties on various environmental issues. 98
As part of the binding legal regime, the Protocol specifies methods
for performing environmental impact assessments for both government
and non-government activities.99
Although government and nonid.
89 See id. at 108-09.

oSee Joyner, supra note 84, at 167.
See The Protocol, supra note 9. See also Joyner, supra note 84, at 165-67.

'1

92 See Joyner, supra note 84, at 165.
9'JOYNER & THEIS, supranote 2, at 110.
"' See The Protocol, supra note 9, Final Act of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special
Consultative Meeting, 30 I.L.M. at 1460.
q5 See The Protocol, supra note 9, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. at 1461.
96 Joyner, supra note 84, at 166. See generally The Protocol, supra note 9.
9' See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 110.

" See The Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 11, 12, 30 I.L.M. at 1465-66. Some of these
environmental issues that CEP will examine include the effectiveness of the Protocol and
measures adopted by the Consultative Parties, the implementation of the Environmental
Impact Assessments, and ways to minimize environmental impacts on Antarctica. See id.
99 See id. art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464 and annex I, 30 I.L.M. at 1473-76.
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government activities are grouped together, the Protocol creates three
separate categories of activities for environmental impact assessment
analysis.00 The analysis of an activity is based on its potential impact on
the environment.'0 ' The activities are separated into those having less than
a minor or transitory impact, those that have no more than a minor or
transitory impact, and those activities having more than a minor or
transitory impact."0 2 In application, if the activities do not comply with the
Protocol and are such that the actor must give notice under the Antarctic
Treaty, the activities are to be suspended, modified, or canceled.10 3
For the Protocol to enter into force, all of the Parties must ratify
°
it." In order to actually implement the Protocol, the Parties must then
enact their own domestic laws.'0 5 All of the Consultative Parties have now
ratified the Protocol. 0 6 But many have not yet enacted domestic
legislation to conform to the Protocol.'0 7 The Protocol addresses
compliance by other States in requiring that Consulting Parties take
measures to ensure that other States do not violate the Protocol.'
Parties
are also directed to alert all other Parties when non-Party States have
'ao See id. art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464.
101See id.
30.

See id.

See id. art. 3, para. 4(b), 30 I.L.M. at 1463. Article VII(5) of the Antarctic Treaty
requires that Parties to the Treaty give notice to the other Contracting Parties before:
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or
nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or
proceeding from its territory;
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by
it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph
2 of Article I of the present Treaty.
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 7, art. VII(5), 12 U.S.T. at 797, 402 U.N.T.S. at 74-75.
304 See The Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 22, 23, 30 I.L.M. at 1469.
303

305

See id. art. 13, 30 I.L.M. at 1466.

See Environmentalists Hail 50-year Ban on Antarctic Mining; Agreement Protects All
the Region's Flora. Fauna, BALT. SUN, Jan. 15, 1998, at 17A, available in 1998 WL
4946702; Telephone Interview with Harlan Cohen, supra note 22.
'07 See US Ratifies Protocol!!!, The Antarctica Project Newsletter, June 1997, available
at <http://www.asoc.org/currentpress/junel997.htm> [hereinafter The Antarctica Project
Newsletter (June)].
'0' See The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 13, para. 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1466 ("Each Party shall
exert appropriate efforts... to the end that no one engages in any activity contrary to this
Protocol.").
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9
violated the terms of the Protocol.
. Thus, a hodgepodge of international agreements govern the
activities of States active in the Antarctic region. These include the
Antarctic Treaty itself, the various Conventions, and the recommendations
and discussions that occur at the Consultative Meetings." ' Collectively,
they are normally referred to as the Antarctic "system.""' The system is
different now than was envisioned when it began in 1959.12 It has
adapted to meet the changing needs and interests of the international
community and will continue to adapt as new issues arise." 3
1999]

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTING ANTARCTICA
General international law finds its source either in custom or in
international treaties." 4 Law that results from custom is based on the
repeated practice of a set of principles by the states." 5 The practice is
typically some form of official government conduct." 6 The conduct may
be anything from official statements, to government decisions, to
inaction." 7 Not every state must believe that the law is valid, but a
majority of countries must recognize it in order to make it binding."'
When law is based on treaties, a more clearly defined version of law
exists. "' 9 The goal of having treaties is to "eliminate ambiguities,
20
minimize confusion, and... clarify the future obligations of parties."'
General international laws and agreements should apply to

See id. art. 13, para. 4 ("Each Party shall draw the attention of all other Parties to any
activity which in its opinion affects the implementation of the objectives and principles
of this Protocol.").
"o See van der Essen, supra note 47, at 29.
..See Verhoeven, supra note 8, at 14.
11 See van der Essen, supra note 47, at 29.
109

113 See
14

id.

See David Everett Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A CriticalReview of the

Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

293, 294-95 (1993).
115 See id.

See id.
7
1"
See id. at 294.
"l See id. at 294-95.
" See id. at 295.
116

20

Id.
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Antarctica as elsewhere. 121 However, issues arise for international law that
are based on territorial sovereignty.12 Assuming that no country can claim
territorial sovereignty over Antarctica, then the rules that normally require
countries to have territorial sovereignty cannot apply. 23 If these laws
cannot apply, and it is increasingly clear that this is true, then Antarctica
should be treated as falling under the international law that applies to the
res comunis or the global commons. 24 In these areas "the international
community has relied upon norms of conduct that permit open access and
use by all States subject to the rule of reason."' 25 In effect, the gaps left by
26
general international agreements and laws are filled by custom. '
Accordingly, the norms of conduct or custom that would form the basis for
international law in Antarctica would also be based upon a rule of reason
in the absence of other international law. 127 This would mean that
countries could perform activities in Antarctica as long as those activities
do not have negative ramifications for the other States.'28
With regard to international agreements that apply solely to
Antarctica, the international community has the security of the Antarctic
Treaty System.2 9 Even with the Antarctic Treaty system in place,
however, the question remains as to what international law actually exists
on the continent. 3 ' The question is important because the answer
determines what countries are included in the Treaty system and how
influential the Treaty is over their actions. For example, are the provisions
of the various treaties binding on States that do not sign them? Is the
Treaty regime so broad as to include all States regardless of their own
beliefs or acquiescence? A number of different views with regard to what
sort of international laws exist in application to the Antarctic.
The first major view of possible existing law is based almost

12. See

Jonathan I. Charney, The Antarctic System and C'ustomaij, InternationalLaw, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA, supra note 3, at 51, 55.
122 See id. at 56.
123
See id.
'_4See id. at 56-58.
'2'Id. at 56.
126See id.

27See id. at 57.
2. See

id. at 56-57.

'-See id. at 60-6 1.
30
See id. at 61.
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3
exclusively on the Antarctic Treaty system.' ' The idea is that if a number
of States are interested in a topic, they can join together to make special or
regional law, like the Antarctic Treaty System, which would apply to all
States regardless of whether those States are part of the agreement.'32
Generally, however, for a broad law to apply in this manner, territorial
sovereignty or consent by the non-signing States is necessary to bind those
States. 33 Non-signing States to the Antarctic Treaty have not agreed to be
bound and territorial sovereignty does not exist. Thus, the Antarctic
Treaty System alone does not make up a body of law that binds the nonsigning States.'34
The argument that an international law be applied to non-signing
parties is strengthened if these States were intended to be bound and gave
their consent to be bound by the law as well.'35 Although no State has
expressly bound itself to the Antarctic Treaty System in this way, some
States may have bound themselves implicitly by not objecting to the law,
or by their comments or writings of support at United Nations meetings.'36
Finally, some non-signing States may be indirectly bound because they
have almost an obligation to cooperate with Parties to the Antarctic Treaty
in order to conduct any activity in Antarctica. 37 In sum, non-Parties to the
Antarctic Treaty System may be considered bound to the international law
38
imposed by the System in a number of ways)
The second possible view of existing law in Antarctica is that an
international law exists that is binding on all countries. The basis of this
law is the theory that Antarctica is preserved for the "common heritage of
mankind."' 39 No set definition of the "common heritage of mankind"
exists. 40 However, definitions commonly contain the same five elements:
1)the area in question must not be subject to appropriation; 2) resource
13,See

id.

' See id. at 62. The International Court of Justice has recognized that countries could
establish certain regional rules of behavior. See id.

...
See id. at 62-65.

114 See id. at 63. Others disagree and think that the Antarctic Treaty System does provide
a legal basis for enforcement against even non-signing States. See, e.g., Charney, supra
note 121, at 63 n.29.
'sSee id. at 66.

'16 See id. at 68-71.
...
See
' See
"9
See
140 See

id. at 72.
id. at 73-74.
id. at 75.
Heim, supra note 1,at 827.
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management must be shared by all countries; 3) profits or benefits from
the exploitation of resources must be shared by all mankind; 4) the area
must be specifically set aside for peaceful purposes; and 5) the given area
must be "preserved for future generations."' 41
This theory gained momentum and challenged the Antarctic Treaty
System in the mid-1980's.142 In fact, the concept formed the basis of two
major treaties that address international law in both of the other common
spaces: the Moon Treaty of 1979143 and the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention.144 Developed and developing countries differ on the
applicability of this principle to Antarctica. 45 Developing countries
believe that a multinational board should be designated to regulate the
exploitation of resources. 46 They also believe that the benefits from
exploitation should be spread among all of the nations. 47 In contrast,
developed countries believe merely that they should have a right to exploit
resources
in a common heritage area if they are technologically able to do
14 8
SO.

Part of the reluctance that some States have in treating Antarctica
as a common heritage area may be because an express designation of the
continent as such a zone would essentially void the territorial claims of the
seven initial claimants. 149 The claimants have been the most vocal in
opposing the inclusion of the common heritage theory in application to
Antarctica.'5 The application of the doctrine to Antarctica is still very
'41

See id.

See JOYNER& THEIS, supra note 2, at 161.
14'Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
142

Bodies, openedfor signature Dec. 5, 1979, art. 11, para. 1, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
20, UN Doc. No. A/34/20, reprinted in 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, and in 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered
into force July 11, 1984). See Chamey, supra note 121, at 77.
114United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), revised by U.N. Doc A/CONF. 62/122/corrs. 3
& 8 (1982). See Charney, supra note 121, at 77.
145 See Heim, supra note 1, at 827-28.
"' See id. at 827.
147 See id.
148 See id. The United States also had concerns about justifying its presence in Antarctica
to the international community if the Common Heritage concept gained ground. See
JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 161-62.
"' See Harminderpal Singh Rana, Note, The "Common Heritage of Mankind" & the
FinalFrontier:A Revaluation of Values Constituting the InternationalLegal Regime for
Outer Space Activities, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 225, 237-38, 237 n.66 (1994).
"' See Charney, supra note 121, at 79.
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controversial.'"' This debate is the main reason why the "common
heritage" principle is not the underlying international law in Antarctica at
52
the present time.

The third major view of a possible international law presently at
work in Antarctica is based on the idea that due to the implementation of
the Antarctic Treaty System, certain norms or customs have developed
that have the effect of a general international law.' s3 These customs
include standards such as non-militarization and the freedom of scientific
research.' 4 The Parties to the Treaty that have acted in Antarctica have
taken care thus far to act in conformity with the customs articulated by the
Treaty.' 5 Even States that have not been involved in activities in
Antarctica have indicated that they have accepted the customs under the
Treaty System as law.' 56
Some States are likely to resist the progression of the customs into
law.' 5' While the claimant States enjoy the benefit of the protection of
their claims by the Antarctic Treaty, they may see the development of the
customs under the Treaty into law as a threat to their claims.'58 Certainly,
if the customs are accepted as law, then the claimant States are bound as
any other and cannot exploit their claims without interference.' 9
Regardless of their views, there does seem to be a general international
law that applies to Antarctica based on the customs stated in the Antarctic
Treaty.
Some of the existing general international agreements may apply to
Antarctica if they are not based on territorial sovereignty, or if they are
based on international custom.'6 ° Custom that develops in this geographic
area should be based upon a rule of reason that is used for the other global
commons.' 6' Similarly, international law that specifically addresses

...
See generally id. at 79-80.
3.2 See id. at 80.

i See id.
154 See id. at
96.
55
56

See id. at 81.

See id. at 81.

.' See id. at 91-92.
See id.

158

"9See id
60 See id. at 55-61.
"16See id. at 57.
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Antarctica is also based on both treaties and custom.' The law based on
the Antarctic Treaty System may apply to non-signing States if they have
consented to be bound by implication.'63 Further, non-signing States may
be bound to an international law resulting from the Treaty because they are
unable to take part in activities in Antarctica without cooperating with the
signing Parties."6 The customs that develop from the Treaty System may
also help to form the basis for an international Antarctic law.' 65 The
common heritage principle does not apply to Antarctica at this time,
primarily because it is so controversial.'66 Although general international
law applies to Antarctica in a limited fashion, the Antarctic Treaty System
also forms the basis for international law that specifically addresses
67
Antarctica. 1
IV.

UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAWS AFFECTING ANTARCTICA

Generally, United States domestic laws interact with the
international community only in a limited way. These laws are governed
by a "concept of extraterritoriality [which] consists of a country's
application of its laws and regulations to activities outside its .
territory.' 161 In general, a presumption exists against the extraterritorial
application of domestic law. 69 In effect, this means that domestic laws are
presumed not to apply outside of the United States and its territories. 7 '
The rationale for the presumption is the governmental interest in
avoiding civil suits that may hang up international programs and
research.'' An international claim against another country or even a
United States actor in another country for violation of a domestic
162
163

See id. at 61.
See id. at 68.

4 See id. at 72.
165

See id. at 80.

" See id. at 75.
67 See id. at 95.

"' Jennifer A. Purvis, The Long Arm of the Law? ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
Environmental Legislation to Human Activity in Outer Space, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV.455, 460 (1994).
6'

See Lauren Levy, Stretching Environmental Statutes to Include Private Causes of

Action and ExtraterritorialApplication: Can it be Done?, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

65,
85 (1997), available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Djelp File.
70
1 See id.
272See

generally Levy, supra note 169.

1999]
How ASTCA OF 1996 FAILS ANTARCTICA
667
environmental law could bring research and other activities, both public
and private, to a halt. 172 Another reason why courts recognize a
presumption against extraterritoriality is that application of United States
laws to actors of other countries has the potential to cause international
173
strife by conflicting with foreign laws.
However, courts recognize at least three times when the
presumption does not occur: 1) when Congress expresses an intent that
the law apply outside of the United States; 2) when not applying the law
extraterritorially would cause adverse effects within the United States (as
with antitrust laws); and 3) when the actions themselves occur within the
United States. 74 In addition to the treaties that the United States has
signed and observed as part of the Antarctic Treaty System, some court
cases have laid the foundation and explored the limits of the
extraterritorial application of domestic laws. 75 The primary case that
addresses whether domestic law should apply to Antarctica is
176
EnvironmentalDefense Fund,Inc. v. Massey.
In Massey, the Environmental Defense Fund brought suit against
Walter E. Massey, the Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF),
177
for not complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
in burning waste in Antarctica. 8 Under NEPA, federal agencies are
required to prepare an EIS before engaging in any activity that may
significantly affect the environment.1 79 The NSF argued that their
activities did not have to comply to NEPA in Antarctica.'8 They relied

112 See Robert S. Cunningham, NEPA and the Rest of the World, SB64 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
461, 464 (1997), availablein WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database.
. See Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1014
(5th Cir. 1988), reh g granted 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 1271 (5 Cir.
1990), cert. granted sub nora. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 498 U.S. 808 (1990), aff'd 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
"7See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd 986 F.2d 528, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
"' See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm n, 499 U.S. at 248; Massey, 986 -F.2d at
531-32.

See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
' National Environmental Policy Act, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
171 See Massey, 986 F.2d at 529.
"9 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
176

18 See Massey, 986 F.2d at 530.
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instead on Executive Order 12,114.8
Executive Order 12,1148' used primarily the same standard that
NEPA requires. The real difference between NEPA and the Executive
Order was that the Executive Order did not give a basis for a cause of
action against a federal agency if the agency did not comply with its
requirements. 8 3 Thus, if NSF was bound only by the Executive Order,
then the agency's decision would not be subject to judicial review,
regardless
of whether the agency prepared an EIS on the incineration of
84
waste. 1
Whereas the presumption against application of domestic laws
worked in the context of foreign countries, the court decided that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was weakened when applied to a
common area like Antarctica. 85 Thus, the court in Massey held that the
NSF was bound to follow the requirements of NEPA in incinerating waste
in Antarctica. 86
The court noted that the presumption against
extraterritoriality existed to prevent discord between countries.' 87 In ruling
against the NSF, the court based its decision on the fact that applying
NEPA to Antarctica could result in little international conflict between
countries in Antarctica, which is technically owned by no one.'88 In dicta,
the court said that if NEPA were to conflict with more important foreign
policy concerns, such as not holding up a project, then the foreign policy
concerns would trump NEPA's requirements.' 89
In attempting to regulate the actions of their own nationals, the
United States has also enacted legislation that specifically addresses
Antarctica. This occurred for the first time in 1978, with the passage of
the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978.190 This law denoted a responsible
agency and added an element of predictability to the government's

181See id.
2See Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, Exec. Order No. 12,114,
3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
183 See Massey, 986 F.2d. at 530; Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. § 356.
184 See Massey, 986 F.2d. at 530; Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. § 356.
185 See Massey, 986 F.2d. at 533.
6
11 See id. at 536-37.
87
1 See id. at 533.
1' See id. at 534.
'8 9 See id.

0See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2401-12 (1994).
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regulation of its nationals in Antarctica.' ' The 1978 Act directed the
National Science Foundation (NSF) to perform the monitoring function of
the United States actors in Antarctica.'92 It also directed NSF to "ensure
protection of the native flora and fauna and preservation of the ecosystem;
and to develop and issue regulations to control pollution in the
1999]

Antarctic.

'7 93

The most recent domestic law applicable to Antarctica is the
Antarctic Science, Tourism, and Conservation Act of 1996 (ASTCA).' 94
Congress passed the law on October 2, 1996 with almost unanimous
approval.'95 Some of the concerns that motivated Congress to act were the
potential for environmental harm in Antarctica due to increased tourism
and major concerns about the effects of mineral exploitation on the
Antarctic environment. 6 Politicians and environmentalists agree that the
law represents a consensus for parties with an interest in the Antarctic. 97
Congress tried to address its environmental concerns in two
primary ways when enacting the law. First, Congress officially and
broadly applied NEPA to all activity in Antarctica, be it governmental or
non-governmental activities.' 98
Second, Congress conformed the
environmental monitoring procedures of the United States to those
required by the Madrid ProtocolY 9 This conformance was needed so that
the Protocol could become law internationally. The concerns about NEPA
and the presumption against extraterritoriality after Massey are removed
because the ASTCA met one of the three basic exceptions to the
presumption:
the expression of Congress for the law to apply
2
extraterritorially. °
Congress listed a number of specific ways for the new law to

191See id.

"'a See id.
'"JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 111. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2401-12.
19416

U.S.C. §§ 2461-66.
"' See Clinton Signs Legislation to Implement Antarctic Environmental Protection
Protocol. BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Oct. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, database
BNA-IED.
16

See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., S. REP. NO. 104-332, at

1-4, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437, 3437-40.
See id. at 4, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3440.
"g See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401, 2403a.
' See id.; The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, 30 I.L.M. at 1473-76.
'7

20o

See Massey, 986 F.2d. at 531-32.
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comply with the Protocol. 0 For example, Congress noted that the law
would require the NSF to issue regulations to protect the flora and fauna of
Antarctica. 2 2 NSF is also required to issue regulations for waste disposal
and waste management. 23 Furthermore, the Coast Guard issued their own
regulations to prohibit marine pollution in Antarctic waters.20 4 Congress
directs the EPA to write regulations about environmental assessments of
non-governmental activities. 05 More generally, the law forbids mineral
exploitation, the introduction of certain materials into the Antarctic, and
certain forms of waste disposal. 0 6
One of the most important sections of the ASTCA is section
2403a. This section addresses the environmental impact assessments,2 7
and it is here that the application of NEPA and the conformance to the
Protocol are the clearest and take the greatest shape. 2" The section affects
federal activities, federal activities carried out with foreign governments,
and non-governmental activities.2° In addressing so many different
activities, the section affects a number of federal agencies, including the
Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
NSF. '0
Each of the federal agencies affected has been given two years to
write regulations and procedures to conform to the new Act.2 1 ' The Coast
Guard has already come out with a Final Rule to direct its own activities
related to the continent. 1 2 However, according to its own assessment, the
Coast Guard will not be affected much by the ASTCA.213 In fact, only
thirteen ships are affected.2 4 The new measures adopted by the Coast
See generally S. REP. No. 104-332, reprintedin 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437.
See id. at 5, reprintedin 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437, 3441.
203 See id.
20
202

2_4See

id.

205 See id.

See id.
See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
208 The Code mentions the application of NEPA to federal activities in Antarctica
multiple times. See id.
209 See id. § 2403a(a), (b), and (c).
2 0 See id. See also S. REP. No. 104-332, at 5, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437,
206
207

3441.
2" See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a.
212See Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protection Protocol, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,043 (1997).
2"3See id. at 18,043-18,045.
214See id.
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Guard are primarily protective measures for emergencies and reduction in
waste.1 5
The EPA is responsible for the oversight of applying section 2403a
of the ASTCA to non-governmental actors, such as tour operators.1 6 The
agency recently issued a Final Rule.1 7 It requires all tour operators to
perform environmental impact assessments that are later reviewed by the
EPA.21 8 In fact the Act specifically directs the agency to merely
implement the Protocol's requirements. 2 9 This Final Rule basically
rephrases the environmental impact procedures enumerated in the
Protocol.
The National Science Foundation has been in charge of Antarctic
activities for many years.22 ' Its role under section 2403a of the ASTCA is
to develop regulations for government agencies.222 The NSF must also
issue regulations for joint activities that are to be carried out in
conjunction with foreign governments.223 The Foundation has already
issued its final regulations for the NSF to follow. 224 These regulations also
parallel the EIA procedures of the Protocol.2 Section 641.11 specifies
the NSF's policy regarding environmental assessments and safeguards for
joint and solo projects.226 The regulations also note that they apply to "all
1999]

25 See id.
216

See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a. See also S. REP. No. 104-332, at 5, reprinted in 1997

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437, 3441; Environmental Impact Assessment of Nongovernmental
Activities in Antarctica, 40 C.F.R. §§ 8-8.12 (1997).
217

See 40 C.F.R. §§ 8-8.12 (1997).

211See
2'9

220

id. §§ 8.7, 8.8, 8.9.
See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(c).
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 8-8.12; The Protocol, supra note 9. However, the EPA regulations

also require the operator (that is, a "person or persons organizing a nongovernmental
expedition to or within Antarctica") to prepare a Preliminary Environmental Review
Memorandum (PERM) which is to be given to the EPA for its determination as to
whether the activity will have less than a minor or transitory impact. See 40 C.F.R. § 8.6.
221 See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 28. NSF was selected to be the lead agency in
1959. See id.
222 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2405(a); Telephone Interview with Anita Eisenstadt, Assistant
General Counsel, National Science Foundation, Office of the General Counsel (Feb. 20,
1998).
223

See id.

224

See Environmental Assessment Procedures for Proposed National Science Foundation

Actions in Antarctica, 45 C.F.R. §§ 641.10 to 641.22 (1998).
22
1 See id. §§ 641.15 to 641.18.
226
See id. § 64 1.11.
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proposed projects, programs and actions authorized or approved by, or
subject to the control and
responsibility of NSF that may have an impact
' 22 7
on the environment.
Although the ASTCA states that it is applying NEPA to all federal
actors in Antarctica, in truth, it is a modified version of NEPA, since it
incorporates the language and procedure of the Protocol. 228 As stated
above, NEPA requires that an agency conduct an environmental impact
assessment if the agency expects an action to be one "significantly
affecting the quality of human environment. 2 29 In contrast, conformance
with the Protocol (and, thus, the ASTCA) requires an impact statement of
some kind for almost every activity.23°
Under the Protocol, there are three separate levels of environmental
impact review and these levels of review vary with the severity of the
expected impact."' For example, if the impact is expected to have less
than a minor or transitory impact, then no environmental impact
assessment is required and the activity may proceed unchecked. 32 The
second level of review occurs when the impact of an activity is thought to
be no more than minor or transitory, then an Initial Environmental
Evaluation (IEE) is required.2 33 A list of IEEs must then be provided to
the other Parties at the next Consultative meeting.23 The third level of
review parallels the review required under NEPA. The Protocol states that
if an activity will have "more than a minor or transitory impact" then a

It is the Policy of NSF to use all practicable means, consistent with its
authority, to ensure that potential environmental effects of actions
undertaken by NSF in Antarctica, either independently or in
cooperation with another country, are appropriately identified and
considered during the decisionmaking process, and that appropriate
environmental safeguards which would limit, mitigate or prevent
adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment are identified.
See id.
227
See id. § 645.12.
:2See generally 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a; The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, 30 I.L.M. at
1473-76.
229 NEPA, § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
23 See generally The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464 and annex I, 30
I.L.M. at 1473-76.
_31See id.
232 See id.

233See id.
2314See id.
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Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE) is required. ' A CEE
spells out a lengthy process for approval of activities that fall in this
category. 3' The ASTCA specifically states that the NEPA phrase
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" should be
'
regarded as the same as "more than a minor or transitory impact."237
Thus,
in incorporating these three levels from the Protocol into the ASTCA, the
ASTCA requires even stricter environmental assessment procedures than
NEPA.
Domestic law generally is presumed not to apply
extraterritorially.2 38 However, with regard to Antarctica, the courts have
ruled in the past that domestic laws may apply in certain circumstances. 39
Further, domestic law may apply extraterritorially if it is the intent of
Congress to do so."' In the case of the ASTCA, the law will apply
extraterritorially because it was Congress' intent that the law do so in
order to conform with an international treaty.24 ' In conforming with the
Protocol, the ASTCA provides even more stringent requirements for
environmental assessment than NEPA.
V. SECTION 2403A(B) OF THE ASTCA: FEDERAL ACTIVITIES CARRIED
OUT JOINTLY WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

The United States government is no stranger to joint activities with
other countries. The Department of State determined in 1984 that since
the start of the U.S. Antarctic Program, between nine hundred and one
thousand scientists from approximately thirty foreign countries had done
some work with the Program.242 In part, projects are conducted jointly to
.35
See id.
236

See id.

,3116 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(a) (1994).
,33
See Levy, supra note 169, at 84.
211 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev 'd986 F.2d 528, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
240

See id.

24,See

16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401, 2403 (1994).
242See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 96. The United States has had agreements in
recent years with Canada, Russia, Brazil, Italy, Australia, Britain, Germany, and New
Zealand, among others. The agreements deal with topics ranging from research to air
transport services to mapping. See Spadework to Get to Bottom of Antarctica "sIce Age,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Oct. 21, 1997). See also Agreement Between the United
States and Canada Concerning Cooperation on the Radarsat [Remote Sensing] Project,
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243
reduce costs on the bigger projects.
Perhaps recognizing the need for some guidelines to conduct joint
activities among nations, the Protocol specifically addresses such
activities. Article 8 of the Protocol states: "Where activities are planned
jointly by more than one Party, the Parties involved shall nominate one of
their number to coordinate the implementation of the environmental
impact assessment procedures set out in Annex 1.,1 4 The Protocol uses
the word "Party" to indicate that a State has signed or ratified the
the6
Protocol.245 States that have not done this, but have acceded to 24
activity.
Antarctic
in
participate
to
Parties
the
on
dependent
are
Protocol
On the domestic side, section 2403a(b) of the ASTCA also deals
specifically with federal activities carried out jointly with foreign
governments.247 In the section, Congress attempts to implement the
parallel clause in the Protocol while minimizing the exposure of the
United States to environmental liability caused by the actions of other
Under the language of this section, "joint activity" is not
governments.
249
The ASTCA instead states that the President has the power to
defined.
designate federal agencies to define joint activity themselves.2 "° The
language of the ASTCA is not quite the same as that of the Protocol.
Whereas the Protocol appears to be somewhat democratic about selecting
who shall be responsible for the environmental impact assessment

with Memorandum of Understanding (entered into force Nov. 12, 1991), available in
1991 WL 494985; Air Transport Services Interim Agreement, with Memorandum of
Consultations, Between the United States of America and Brazil (entered into force Dec.
10, 1984), available in 1984 WL 161858; Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Geological Survey of the Department of Interior of the United States of America and the
Experimental Geophysics Observatory of the Ministry of Universities and Scientific
Research of the Italian Republic Concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the
Earth Sciences (entered into force Apr. 19, 1991) available in 1991 WL 538866.
_43
See Augustine, supra note 5.
244 The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, para. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 1464.
2" See Patrizia De Cesari, Scientific Research in Antarctica: New Developments, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA, supra note 3, at 413, 421. A "Consulting Party"
is specifically defined as a Party that has voting power. See The Protocol, supra note 9,
art. 1, para. d, 30 I.L.M. at 1462.
246 See De Cesari, supra note 245, at 442.
247 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
248 See id.
249See id.
250 See id.
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procedures, the ASTCA is not.2"' Instead, the ASTCA glosses over the
involvement of acceding countries and focuses more on the contribution of
the involved Parties in determining which one should do the EIAs.252
Section 2403a(b) states in part:
(2) Where the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
lead United States agency planning an Antarctic joint
activity, determines that(A)the major part of the activity is being
contributed by a government or governments
other than the United States;
(B) one such government is coordinating the
implementation of environmental impact
assessment procedures for that activity; and
(C) such government has signed, ratified, or acceded
to the Protocol,
the requirements of subsection (a) of this section shall not
25 3
apply with respect to that activity.
The section also states that decisions made by States under paragraph (2)
and U.S. agency decisions in conjunction with joint activities are not
subject to judicial review. 4
Thus, in activities where the United States is the main contributor,
the federal agencies must comply with the three-tier environmental impact
assessment procedures of 2403a(a), 55 The implication is that even stricter
standards than NEPA will apply to these joint activities. Under the
Protocol, the other involved Parties may want to pick a country besides the
United States to do the environmental impact assessment and can decide
among themselves which country will bear the responsibility.2- 6 The
domestic law of the United States at least ensures that if the Parties want
another State to do an EIA in compliance with the Protocol, the United
2."'See The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1464. See also 16 U.S.C.A. §
2403a(b).
2.2 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
253 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b). Subsection 2403a(a) of ASTCA lists the EIA procedures.
See id.
254 See id.
2"
256

See id. § 2403a(b).
See The Protocol, supra note 9, art. 8, para. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 1464.
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States will still have to analyze the impact at home, on its own." This is a
good method for ensuring environmental responsibility for joint projects
in which the United States is contributing the most money, since the
United States is already equipped for such analyses." 8
Different issues arise when the United States is involved in a joint
activity but is not the main contributor.259 If another government is
coordinating the EIAs and has signed or ratified the Protocol, then the
United States does not have to do an EIA at all.26' This is not an issue of
concern for an activity that requires a CEE. That is, for an activity that
may have more than a minor or transitory impact, the standard of
environmental inquiry is very high under the Protocol.26 ' The standard is
likewise fairly high for an activity having not more than a minor or
transitory impact.262 Risk is associated with activities that are expected to
have a minor or transitory impact. In such a case, the States review the
environmental impact of the activity according to their own domestic
standards. 263 The signing and ratifying Parties are all required to have
domestic laws to control their own activities and thus are likely to make
better decisions because they will have an established framework to guide
them.
In addition, the ASTCA includes acceding States, countries that
have agreed to abide by the terms of the Protocol. 2 4 More and more
States are acceding to the Protocol. 265 The problem with allowing these
countries to be involved with the EIA process is that, even if the States are
the major contributors, the States may have joined the Antarctic Treaty
System for political reasons with only a small amount of expert knowledge

See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2403a(a), 2403(b).
See NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
29 The United States is not always the biggest contributor. See Telephone Interview with
257
258

Cohen, supra note 22.
Harlan
26
1 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
263 See The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, arts. 2, 3, 30 I.L.M. at 1473.
262 See id.
263 See The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, art. 1, para. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 1473-74.
2
See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b); Telephone Interview with Harlan Cohen, supra note 22.
These States agree to join and follow the Protocol, but their methods of accession may
vary. For example, some may require a Parliamentary decision, whereas others may just
require an Administrative action.
2" Some, such as India, China, and Brazil, for political or status reasons. See JOYNER &
THEIS, supra note 2,at 174.
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6
of Antarctica.
The other Parties' review of the activities likely to have
the most impact on the environment is limited. The Protocol gives
countries broad discretion in doing EIAs in general. 67 For example, a
country may decide on its own, via an environmental analysis, if an
activity is going to have a minor or transitory impact. If the country does
68
so, the other countries perform no review at all of the decision.1
For an acceding country without domestic laws on the subject, this
carries with it potentially negative side effects. For example, assume an
acceding country decides that it wants to conduct some research that
involves drilling. The country may not recognize potential harmful threats
of the activity to the environment. Even if the country understands that a
threat to the environment exists from drilling, it may be unable to assess
the impact accurately using the methodology required by the Protocol
because it has no real knowledge of the unique Antarctic environment. 69
The end result is that an acceding country may decide that questionable
activities will have a minor or transitory impact and the other countries do
not review this decision.
Only the environment suffers in such a
situation. Certainly some other countries may be concerned when learning
of potential environmental impacts due to the activities of acceding
countries. However, concerns about causing international strife may make
these observing countries reluctant to intrude on the judgment of the
266

See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 175.

The Committee on Environmental

Protection (CEP) may be able to offer some advice to countries in charge of performing
Impact Assessments. See The Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 11, 12, 30 I.L.M. at 1465-66.
However, the Parties disagree about the role of CEP. See The Antarctica Project
Newsletter (June), supra note 107. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC)
believes that CEP's abilities to give meaningful advice to countries may be limited since
some Parties "do not want it to evaluate the adequacy of environmental assessments for
Antarctic activities." See id. ASOC is also concerned because the qualifications
necessary to act as a representative of CEP were "watered down" by the Parties so that
political representatives may qualify rather than qualified scientists. See id.
267
See The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, art. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 1473. The Article states:
1. The environmental impacts of proposed activities referred to in
Article 8 of the Protocol shall, before their commencement, be
considered in accordance with appropriate national procedures.
2. If an activity is determined as having less than a minor or
transitory impact, the activity may proceed forthwith.
Id.
268 See id.
269 See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 175.
27 See The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, art. 1, para. 2, 30 1.L.M. at 1473.
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acceding countries.
In relation to the United States, the ASTCA allows acceding
countries to coordinate EIAs when they are the main contributors.272 This
can also be dangerous for the same reason that allowing acceding
countries to do their own EIAs is dangerous. Acceding countries may
perform parts of the EIA process that would not be checked by the other
countries, either because they do not need to be under the Protocol or
because international pressure prevents the other interested Parties from
doing so. 2 73 Additionally, under the ASTCA, the United States allows
itself to be exempted from the process when the acceding country qualifies
to do the assessment coordination. 274 The Act goes even further, by
allowing the decisions of the U.S. federal agencies to be protected from
judicial review.27' This means that the United States can rely on countries
that are not prepared to coordinate the EIA assessment procedures and not
be liable for their decisions at home. For these reasons, removing the
United States from the responsibility of environmental impact assessments
when an acceding country is the main contributor to a joint activity in
which the United States is involved is a mistake.
The United States wisely left out the possibility of a State that had
not signed, ratified, or acceded to the Protocol coordinating the EIA
procedures.276 In reality, such a country may not be so different from a
State that has acceded. As discussed before, the Antarctic Treaty System,
Even signing Parties have not abided by the Protocol in recent years and international
pressure appears to have had little effect. See Antarctica Specific Report Findings,
WORLD ENV'T REP., Jan. 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8355988.
2.2 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
273 Again, CEP may be of little use to an unprepared Party. See The Antarctica Project
Newsletter (June), supra note 107.
214 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b); The Antarctica Project Newsletter (June), supra note
107.
" See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b); The Antarctica Project Newsletter (June), supra note
107. Although eliminating the possibility of judicial review is sometimes considered
beneficial for international policy reasons, and may be supported by Massey, it eliminates
one way that the public can ensure that the federal agencies are properly monitoring their
own activities. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296
(D.D.C. 1991), rev'd 986 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Robert M. Andersen, Leading
InternationalEfforts to Improve Environmental Controls in Antarctica While Navigating
National Politics, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 336-39 (1994) (discussing the
feasibility of the applicability of citizen suit provisions of Antarctica).
276 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
271
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and thus the Protocol, may be binding on States that have not agreed to it
in a number of ways: by the sheer force of the System and the implied
2 77
consent of the non-signing States and by custom based on the System.
The most persuasive rationale, however, is that all States are bound by the
Treaty System simply because they must cooperate with the Parties in
order to perform any activities in Antarctica.278 Even if these countries are
bound, however, it does not ensure that they will have any expert
knowledge of the Antarctic to apply to an EIA. 279 The United States
correctly requires that federal agencies not be excused from their
environmental responsibilities when the country involved has not signed,
280
ratified, or acceded to the Treaty.
The same rationale should be applied to acceding countries. As the
number of acceding countries grows and international interest in
Antarctica grows as well, the United States must take steps to ensure that
it is protecting the environment in the best way possible. The United
States should be required to do environmental impact procedures for all
joint activities in which the other States do not seem prepared to do so,
even if only to assess whether the United States should be involved at all.
Instead, the ASTCA places emphasis on contribution.28' Part of the
rationale for this may be that the United States has been one of the major
contributors in the past to much of the research in Antarctica and the
ASTCA was written with a view towards that trend continuing in the
future. 8 2 However, the international community is rapidly changing, and
it is possible that there will be other States in the future that have enough
money to fund major joint activity in Antarctica. These countries may be
as unprepared to participate in the EIA procedure as a country that had
never acceded at all.
In a similar vein, the United States precludes the other Parties from
successfully dealing with the potential problems. In a situation where an
acceding country is contributing the most, the United States would either
have the acceding country do the EIA or else would complete the EIA
2" See supra notes 114-64 and accompanying text.
278

See Charney, supra note 121, at 61-90 (discussing three theories to show that

Antarctic international law is binding on all States).
2.9 See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 2, at 175.
280 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
281

See id.

282

See id.; Telephone Interview with Harlan Cohen, supra note 22.
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themselves.283 Certainly, opportunities may arise where another signing
Party that is more than adequately prepared (such as one of the original
Consulting Parties) could offer to do the EIAs and avoid exposing the
United States and other countries to liability. Reaching a consensus is also
difficult in a situation where there are a number of States working
together, and the U.S. gains nothing by limiting itself to the framework of
the ASTCA.284 However, in such a scenario, the United States is obliged
to do an EIA, no matter how minor its role in the activity.285
The drafters of the ASTCA may, in part, be relying on the Protocol
itself to provide environmental protection where the ASTCA leaves off.
Supporters of the Protocol have listed a number of reasons why at least the
Protocol EIA procedures will be a success.2 86 Some of the reasons include
the ideas that international pressure will keep other countries in line or that
Parties can raise issues of non-conformance by other countries at the
Consultative meetings.2 87 The Protocol also provides at least some review
for CEEs and IEEs.288
However, the United States can not just rely on the strength of the
Protocol to protect the Antarctic environment from joint activities.
Environmental problems still abound even under the Protocol. Some
countries are not following the procedures of the Protocol right now.2 89
The United States may feel more pressure to avoid interfering with other
States than to take its own action. In joint activities where the United
States is not a big player, the NSF may not have an incentive to monitor
the environmental impacts of the activity, although the United States may
290
be the most able to do so.
The United States should have incorporated the flexibility of
Protocol in its procedures for selecting which State should complete the
283 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
See JOYNER & THEIS, supra note
285 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a(b).
286 See Francisco Orrego Vicufia,
284

2, at 175.

The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty: Questions of Effectiveness, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. I (1994).
28' See id. at 4-5.
288 See The Protocol, supra note 9, annex I, arts. 2, 3, 30 I.L.M. at 1474-75.
2" See Charges of Antarctic Degradation Emerge Following Investigation, WORLD

ENV'T REP., Jan. 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8355987.
290 The NSF has been criticized in the past for not being responsible in its environmental
duties. See Jeffery Mervis, Science Cedes Ground to Environmental Concerns, 261
SCIENCE 676, 676 (1993). See also JOYNER & THEIS, supra note 9, at 124.
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ELAs. It could have eliminated the concerns about unprepared countries
performing the impact assessments in some situations and shifted the
burden from the United States to another capable country in others. The
United States would retain the power to negotiate over environmental
issues with other countries if it could simply help choose the EIA
coordinator along with the rest of the group based on the particular
circumstances.
The NSF has tried to rectify these issues somewhat within its own
regulatory scheme. It was responsible for making regulations that conform
to Section 2403a(b) of the ASTCA.2 1' The NSF regulations do address the
interactions of the United States with other countries.292 Section 641.11 of
the regulations appears to be a blanket policy statement that implies that
the United States will investigate the environmental impact of all the
activities in which it is involved.2 93 This section also contains the caveat
that "[i]t is the policy of NSF to use all practicable means, consistent with
its authority" to do so. 294 However, the NSF's authority with regard to
EIAs is granted by the Act.2 95
With regard to joint activities, therefore, the NSF is still limited to
considering the factors that are spelled out in the Act. Thus, the NSF must
still consider contribution by the United States and other Parties.2 96 The
regulations do not spell out effective ways to approach problems present in
1999]

some of the more complex scenarios, as with acceding countries.2 97 The

regulations also did not give the United States the option of yielding the
duties of doing an EIA in the same situation to another prepared Party as
the Protocol allows. 298 The NSF wrote a very broad policy statement,
which may provide it the greatest flexibility possible under the new law.29 9
Unfortunately, the limits of the new law may be too confining when

2.1See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a. See also SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE. SCIENCE, AND

TRANSP., S. REP. No. 104-332, at 5 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3437, 3441;
Telephone Interview with Anita Eisenstadt, supra note 222.
292
See 45 C.F.R. § 641.11.
2'See id.
.94
See id.
95

See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a.
45 C.F.R. §§ 641.10-641.22; 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a.
2" See generally 45 C.F.R. § § 641.10-641.22.
2" See id.
299
See 45 C.F.R. § 641.11.
2" See
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3
dealing with joint projects. ' The success of the regulations, when applied
in conjunction with the limitations of the Act, remain to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Antarctic Science, Tourism, and Conservation Act of 1996
brings with it a number of changes to the United States approach to the
environmental protection of Antarctica. It forces the compliance of
environmental impact assessment procedures with the Madrid Protocol
and NEPA. The Act also eliminates some of the confusion, especially in
wording, between the two regulatory regimes that existed prior to its
passage. Finally, it ensures that United States activities will be properly
monitored and accounted for.
Although the Act has made great strides in reconciling NEPA and
the Protocol, the ASTCA has some drawbacks, especially in the area of
joint international projects. By relying on the amount that the other States
are contributing and their status, rather than on their capability in
performing EIAs, the United States opens itself up to possible
involvement in activity that is harmful to the Antarctic environment.
Within the United States borders, the agencies are even protected from
judicial review if any joint activity goes awry. Further, the ASTCA
prevents the United States from relying on its allies that are very capable
of handling environmental inquiries. The Protocol does not provide a
solid basis to fall back on if the domestic law fails, in part because the
international issues involved are so sensitive and some countries may be
unreliable in their assessment procedures. The United States should allow
a case-by-case analysis of the facts of a joint activity and act as an equal to
the other States in the international community by allowing itself to
participate in the scheme suggested by the Protocol.

"0 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2403a.

